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General and Experimental Psychology Unit, Department of Psychology, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich,
Germany
The notion of predictive coding assumes that perception is an iterative process
between prior knowledge and sensory feedback. To date, this perspective has been
primarily applied to exteroceptive perception as well as action and its associated
phenomenological experiences such as agency. More recently, this predictive, inferential
framework has been theoretically extended to interoception. This idea postulates that
subjective feeling states are generated by top–down inferences made about internal
and external causes of interoceptive afferents. While the processing of motor signals
for action control and the emergence of selfhood have been studied extensively,
the contributions of interoceptive input and especially the potential interaction of
motor and interoceptive signals remain largely unaddressed. Here, we argue for a
specific functional relation between motor and interoceptive awareness. Specifically, we
implicate interoceptive predictions in the generation of subjective motor-related feeling
states. Furthermore, we propose a distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive modes
of agentic action control and suggest that interoceptive input may affect each differently.
Finally, we advocate the necessity of continuous interoceptive input for conscious forms
of agentic action control. We conclude by discussing further research contributions
that would allow for a fuller understanding of the interaction between agency and
interoceptive awareness.
Keywords: predictive coding, motor control, embodied selfhood, interoception, agency
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a resurgence of scientific interest in the foundations of selfhood, our
ability to perceive and maintain a conscious sense of self (Hohwy, 2007; Zahavi, 2008; Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009). The common consensus postulates that selfhood is grounded in bodily
processes, suggesting that it arises from a conjoined processing of bodily signals and afferent
perceptual input (Bermúdez, 1995; Gallagher, 2005). However, the vast majority of research has
focused on the way motor signals contribute to the emergence of selfhood (Roessler, 2005;
Pacherie, 2008; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010), while disregarding the role of interoceptive input.
Interoception refers to the awareness of internal bodily states such as hunger, heartrate, a general
sense of arousal or pain or muscular and visceral sensations which are achieved by processing
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homeostatic signals transmitted by the autonomic nervous
system (Critchley et al., 2004; Garfinkel et al., 2015).
Interoception is thus distinct from exteroception (the intake
and processing of environmental information via sensory
organs) and proprioception (a sense of the body’s position
within an external environment). An important characteristic of
interoceptive signals is that they are transmitted continuously.
In combination with motor signals, they may thus form a core
building block of selfhood which is likewise experienced as a
seamless phenomenological state. Here, we aim to provide an
insight into the interaction between interoceptive awareness and
action perception as the two potential cornerstones leading to
the experience of bodily selfhood.
We will begin by introducing the concept of predictive
coding as the mechanistic process thought to underpin both
interoception and motor experience, thus forming an initial,
theoretical link between both concepts. We will proceed to
discuss empirical work suggesting a functional interplay of
interoceptive and motor signals in the realms of sensory
attenuation and action control, as well as elaborating on the
neuroanatomical architecture suggesting reciprocal connections
between structures linked to interoceptive and motor processing.
We will then offer three proposals detailing the specific functional
relationship between interoception and motor actions. Our
suggestions for this interactive mechanism will highlight the role
of interoceptive predictions for the generation of motor states
and address pre-reflexive (implicit) and reflexive (explicit) modes
of action control. In addition, they will differentiate between the
roles of transitory motor signals and continuous interoceptive
input. Finally, we will touch on the potential impact of social
interactions for generating the mental frameworks used to form
an understanding of self and self-related motor actions. We will
conclude by discussing the implications of considering a joint
contribution of interoception and action to the generation of
conscious selfhood.
EMBODIED SELFHOOD: PREDICTIVE
CODING FOR INTEROCEPTION AND
MOTOR EXPERIENCE
Recent contributions from cognitive science and neuroscience
have led to a major theoretical advance in the field of embodied
cognition by implicating the contribution of ‘predictive
processing’ in the generation of selfhood and its accompanying
constituents such as a feeling of agency and an awareness
of one’s own internal states (Friston, 2002). To date, several
accounts postulate that top–down predictions about the sensory
consequences of events shape their perception, the generation
of selfhood and the general cognitive framework for perceiving
and acting within the environment (Metzinger, 2003, 2004, 2005;
Allen and Friston, 2016). In general, neuronal representations
in higher hierarchical levels are thought to generate predictions
of representations at lower levels. These predictions are
subsequently matched to lower-level representations constructed
from sensory input, thereby generating a prediction error signal.
This mismatch signal travels back up the hierarchy where it is
used to update higher-order representations. This exchange of
signals is thought to occur on multiple levels, thereby generating
a hierarchically structured explanation of sensory input.
The idea of predictive hierarchical models has long been
considered a fundamental mechanistic underpinning of motor
experience. To account for the phenomenology of agency,
initial forward models based on corollary discharge (Blakemore
et al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005; Frith, 2012) have been extended
to consider the experience of agency as a consequence of
outcome predictions formed by hierarchical generative models
(de Vignemont and Fourneret, 2004). For example, Hohwy
(2007) postulates that predictive models for agency may
constitute one instance of the brain’s overall cognitive system
for representing and attending to cognitive and motor states
(for reviews see Friston, 2002; Kersten et al., 2004). Accurately
predicted sensory feedback is thought to be attenuated, thereby
producing a feeling of ‘mineness’ concerning the action and
circumventing the ambiguity of relying purely on intentions,
as only feedback from predicted, self-initiated movement is
attenuated. Accounts in line with this idea have proposed that
disturbances of agency, as experienced in Schizophrenia, are
caused by imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences
of actions (Frith, 1987; Blakemore et al., 2000a; Frith et al., 2000;
Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010). Of particular note is
that a generative explanation of agency is a necessary assumption
for active inference which in itself forms a central component
of popular predictive coding accounts such as the free energy
principle (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Hohwy, 2007, 2010; Friston,
2009; Brown et al., 2013). A prerequisite for modulating one’s
actions to bring about sensory input in accordance with model
predictions (i.e., minimize free energy) is the ability to predict
which actions will lead to a better model confirmation.
Predictive coding has likewise been attributed to
interoception. As early as 1981, Pennebaker and Skelton
demonstrated that perception of bodily sensations was strongly
modulated by participants’ prior beliefs (Pennebaker and Skelton,
1981). However, despite this early observation, interoception
was long considered a purely bottom–up, sensory driven
phenomenon. Recently this view has changed. The idea of
top–down processes for the generation of interoceptive states
was borrowed largely from the exteroceptive domain. Here,
the theory of hierarchical predictive models that follow the
rules of Bayesian inference was originally proposed to account
for the perception of stimuli originating outside of the body
(Friston, 2005; Friston et al., 2009; Adams et al., 2013). Predictive
generative models applied to interoception likewise postulate
the minimization of prediction error as a mechanism for self-
representation (Seth et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2013). Specifically,
self-consciousness is thought to be based on interoceptive
feeling states emerging from the interactions of predictions and
prediction error (Critchley and Seth, 2012). For example, work
exploring a subjective sense of self within a virtual environment
(Nahab et al., 2011) has suggested that it is the result of successful
matches between expected and received sensorimotor signals.
A concrete account of the way in which predictive coding
may contribute to interoception was recently offered by the
interoceptive predictive coding model. Developed by Seth
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et al. (2012) and extended over subsequent years (Seth,
2013; Seth and Friston, 2016), it provides the first theoretical
framework of this account which can be subjected to empirical
investigation. Importantly for the topic of this paper, it also
tentatively highlights the interplay between interoception and
action experience. Seth and colleagues’ model includes an
“agency component” and a “presence component” which are
subdivided into a state and an error module. Within this
framework, the presence component reflects processes related
to interoceptive information whereas the agency component
reflects motor control processes, including forward model
and error monitoring mechanisms that underlie the sense
of agency. The model postulates that control signals are
generated within the state modules of both components.
These signals are passed on to the autonomic system by
the presence component and the sensorimotor system by the
agency component. They are accompanied by prediction signals
transmitted to the error module which presage the outcome of
this signal (Sommer and Wurtz, 2008). In the error module, the
prediction signal is compared to afferent feedback transmitted
by the sensorimotor (agency component) or autonomic system
(presence component). The extent of match or mismatch
between the predicted and afferent signal determines the size
of an error signal which is sent back to the state module
(Paulus and Stein, 2006). According to the model, a sense of
agency or presence is achieved when informative predictions are
successfully matched to afferent inputs, thereby suppressing the
error signal. Conversely, a large error signal due to imprecise or
misinformed predictions leads to a reduced sense of presence or
agency. The model emphasizes the interaction between motor
experience and interoception by postulating that the overall
heightened or lowered interoceptive state will affect the signals
passed from the agency state to the sensorimotor system. In
addition, the agentic predictions about sensorimotor outcomes
are thought to contribute to the overall interoceptive state.
Within the motor domain, the nature of predictive elements
governing action perception has been well defined. Motor
signals are thought to be accompanied by a so-called efference
copy (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). This copy of the motor
command is processed in relevant sensory hubs of the brain
to anticipate the sensory consequences of an action whose
perceived intensity is thereby reduced (Shergill et al., 2003).
Applying this concept to interoception suggest that the same
form of predictive modeling occurs for interoceptive, autonomic
signals. Evidence to this effect comes from a recent study by
Salomon et al. (2016) who reported that presenting a visual
stimulus in tune with participants’ heartbeat resulted in a reduced
neural measure of its exteroceptive perception and a decreased
likelihood of its conscious detection. The authors’ findings thus
offer a tentative indication for a similar predictive modeling
of the interoceptive heartbeat signal which produces the well
documented suppression effect for exteroceptive stimuli that are
presented in an anticipated pattern or manner. A predictive
modulation of the heartbeat signal also fits within the confines
of simulation theory which has been used to suggest that the
brain makes predictive forecasts of affective reactions to future
events to guide actions in the present (Gilbert and Wilson,
2009). With respect to the heartbeat, reports in this domain
have highlighted that mental simulation of movement affects
heart rate and pulmonary ventilation as a function of imagined
effort (Decety et al., 1991), thereby demonstrating that mental
extrapolations have a direct impact on interoceptive signals.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ACTION
REPRESENTATION AND
INTEROCEPTION
Past work has highlighted a potential link between interoception
and motor actions, discussing the successful processing
of interoceptive signals as a prerequisite for hierarchically
structured forms of motor control to achieve anticipated
interoceptive states (Edwards et al., 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2015;
Limanowski, 2017). However, this work has predominantly
focussed on action implementation (e.g., active inference) while
neglecting the way interoceptive processing may contribute
to the perception and subjective experience of actions (e.g.,
agency). The following section will elaborate on the link between
agency and interoception by discussing several lines of evidence
detailing an effect of motor-actions on the construction of
interoceptive awareness and a reverse influence of interoception
on action perception.
Co-occurring Impairments of Motor and
Interoceptive States
Past work has shown that disorders of motor and interoceptive
states often (but not exclusively) occur simultaneously
(Robertson, 2000; Sumner and Husain, 2008; Ruhrmann
et al., 2010; Sierra and David, 2011). Clinical research to
this effect has demonstrated that disorders such as Tourette
syndrome, schizophrenia and depersonalization disorder often
disrupt both feelings of selfhood and action authorship (Seth,
2013; Sedeño et al., 2014). For example, Ardizzi et al. (2016)
reported a relation between altered sensorimotor processes and
interoceptive accuracy in a cohort of patients suffering from
schizophrenia. Based on the observation that schizophrenic
patients had lower interoceptive accuracy, as well as a distorted
sense of body and action ownership, the authors suggested that
both agency and interoceptive states suffered from a loss of basic,
pre-reflexive aspects of selfhood. However, while disorders of
agency and interoceptive states often occur in conjunction, this
is not always the case. As such, not all schizophrenic patients
report a disturbance of conscious selfhood (Ruhrmann et al.,
2010) and studies of disorders such as the Alien Hand syndrome
demonstrate that depersonalization and derealisation do not
necessarily have to impact on agency (Sumner and Husain,
2008). Hence, a closer look at underlying sub-mechanisms and
associated phenomenological markers supporting the interaction
between agency and interoception is warranted.
A further population of interest in this regard are individuals
suffering from deafferentation, the selective loss of cutaneous
touch and proprioception. Deafferentation has been shown to
affect motor experience (Bosbach et al., 2005; Balslev et al., 2007).
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Crucially, deafferentation should have a significant impact on
predictive mechanisms thought to underlie the generation of
agency, as the absence of afferent sensory input no longer allows
the comparison of predictions with proprioceptive feedback.
In support of this, past work has highlighted that patients
with deafferentation are significantly impaired at generating a
sense of agency and adjusting to action outcomes. For example,
Hermsdörfer et al. (2008) reported that an individual with
chronic deafferentation of the trunk and limbs (I.W.) employed
excessive grip force of a hand-held object and was unable to
adjust this according to anticipated load magnitude. I.W. was also
unable to differentiate his own from computer generated actions
when relying on proprioceptive information alone (Balslev et al.,
2007). At a more complex cognitive level, he was unable to
interpret another person’s expectation of weight when seeing
him lift boxes (Bosbach et al., 2005). In extreme cases (for
example high spinal cord injury) deafferentation has also been
shown to affect interoception when both afferent and efferent
pathways are impaired. In this regard, Pistoia et al. (2015)
found that individuals with sensory deafferentiation resulting
from high spinal cord injury were unable to judge their own
emotional response to scenes eliciting fear and anger despite
being able to recognize the emotions in others. Findings in this
regard highlight the importance of sensory input for generating
internal states as well as for adjusting motor actions to perform
efficient movements. They further highlight the importance of
considering the contributions of afferent and efferent pathways
to generate these states, however, a detailed description of this
lies outside the scope of this paper.
Motor States Influence Interoceptive and
Sensory Processing
A more causal line of evidence demonstrates that experimental
manipulation of perceived agency can influence reported
presence in both normal individuals and schizophrenic patients
(Lallart et al., 2009). To this effect, Gutiérrez-Martínez et al.
(2011) demonstrated that participants had higher pain tolerance
if they were able to manipulate an avatar in virtual reality who
was immersed in a pleasant and peaceful environment. Based
on their findings, the authors argued that agentic control within
this peaceful, non-painful reality enabled participants to increase
their sense of presence (here defined according to the Virtual
Reality literature as true immersion in the virtual environment)
to thereby reduce the simultaneous painful experience in real
life.
Input from motor-related states to interoception is also
demonstrated by past work highlighting sensory attenuation
of self-generated actions, in particular the proximal tactile
consequences of actions. For example, participants consistently
report reduced sensory perception of self-generated tickle or
applied force (Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Claxton, 1975; Shergill
et al., 2003). In a series of manuscripts, Blakemore and colleagues
have attributed this phenomenon to internal forward models
that enable a comparison of predicted sensory consequences
of movements to afferent feedback (Blakemore et al., 1998,
1999, 2000b). Interestingly, observations from these imaging
studies suggest that rather than being exclusively exteroceptive
phenomena, sensory attenuation effects of self-produced tickle
sensations may also result from interoceptive feedback as a
consequence of simultaneously activated affective brain systems.
Results show that cortical activity increases not only in the
secondary somatosensory cortex but also in the anterior cingulate
gyrus when subjects experience externally produced relative to
self-produced tactile stimulation (Blakemore et al., 2000b). The
anterior cingulate cortex has been implicated in affective behavior
(e.g., Vogt et al., 1992) and is consistently activated together
with interoceptive brain areas during performance monitoring
(e.g., Klein et al., 2007; cf. discussion below). Hence, there is
reason to assume that the reduced motor experience error signal
for a self-generated and thus accurately predicted action is also
processed by the interoceptive error unit, where it may contribute
to generating attenuated interoceptive (i.e., tickle) sensations.
In particular, the human tactile system, consisting of fast-
conducting afferents (Aβ) and slowly conducting unmyelinated
afferents (C), serves a dual function by providing both sensory-
discriminatory information and affective-motivational qualities.
The latter involves feelings from the body, including pain,
temperature, itch, sensual touch that have been shown to
be processed by neural pathways strongly implicated for
interoceptive processing (cf., Craig, 2002).
Further support for the effect of motor predictions on
interoceptive sensations generated by tactile stimulation comes
from studies on affective touch involving so-called C-tactile (CT)
afferents. Unmyelinated CT afferents in hairy skin have been
found to be specifically tuned to human caress and to directly
project to the insular cortex (Olausson et al., 2002), where the
pleasantness of these sensations correlates with the degree of
insular activation (Löken et al., 2009). Importantly, action has
been found to reduce the intensity of these sensations when
they are self-generated as compared to externally applied (Guest
et al., 2009). Moreover, a recent study manipulating agency for
CT optimal stimulation during interpersonal touch (Gentsch
et al., 2015) showed that predictions about interoceptive states are
generated during self-generated actions and can change haptic
softness perception of another individual’s skin. These results
suggest that agency involves the simulation of interoceptive
sensations (i.e., not only proprioceptive and exteroceptive
sensations), which can in turn amplify the haptic sensory pleasure
derived from the active touch of others. Blakemore and colleagues
hypothesize that this prediction-based modulation of sensory
information processing might facilitate the identification of self-
generated actions and underlie the distinction between one’s
own self and others, thereby contributing to a sense of selfhood
(Blakemore and Frith, 2003). This idea corresponds to past
work exploring the link between impaired motor predictions
and resulting feelings of incompleteness in Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder (OCD). To this effect, Gentsch et al. (2012) reported
electrophysiological evidence indicating that OCD patients suffer
from an inability to suppress the sensory consequences of their
own actions which they likewise attributed to impaired forward
model mechanisms. Most importantly, the authors suggested that
the increased mismatch between predicted and actual outcomes
coincided with feelings of incompleteness (i.e., distressing
sensations of things not being quite right and completed).
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Crucially, extensions of the original interoceptive predictive
coding model introduced above have emphasized the inclusion
of emotional and affective states in interoceptive processing.
Working from the premise that feelings of incompleteness, as
an affective state, are likewise an interoceptive phenomenon, the
results of Gentsch and colleagues once more indicate that an
impaired predictive mechanism relating to agency may influence
the extent of awareness of internal signals (see Box 1 for a
more in depth discussion of interoceptive predictive coding and
affective states).
Interoception Contributes to Error
Awareness and Adaptive Behavior
A primary line of evidence which suggests input from
interoception to action-related states is provided by work
on performance monitoring. For example, Ullsperger et al.
(2010) argue that interoceptive awareness is a prerequisite for
conscious error perception and the resulting implementation
of behavioral adjustments. The authors center this argument
on the anterior insula cortex (AIC), which forms part of
the ‘salience network’ in conjunction with the medial frontal
cortex (pMFC) and the frontal operculum. This system is
linked to processing motivationally important information in
affective and cognitive domains (Peyron et al., 2000; Bartels and
Zeki, 2004; Ramautar et al., 2006; Lamm and Singer, 2010).
In addition, the AIC is commonly viewed as a monitor and
regulator of the body’s homeostatic signals and interoceptive
states (Craig, 2002, 2009) via its functional connections to the
autonomic nervous system (Matthews et al., 2004). Based on
this, the authors suggest the AIC may serve as a platform
to conscious error awareness by acting either as a monitor
or an active agent eliciting an error orienting response in
the autonomic nervous system. The perception of this error
related arousal pattern is thought to produce conscious error
awareness which in turn enables the organism to recruit mental
and physical resources to perform behavioral adjustments. The
authors develop their argument across several lines of research:
in conjunction with other known systems, the anterior insula
is consistently activated during performance monitoring. In a
meta-analysis of 55 fMRI studies, Klein et al. (2007) report
pMFC and AIC activation across multiple task conditions
calling for behavioral adjustments. These included pre-response
conflict, decision uncertainty, response errors and negative
feedback. Crucial for the authors’ claim that the AIC forms
part of a chain leading to the recruitment of adaptive
resources was the selective activation of the AIC during tasks
calling for different kinds of behavioral adaptation. Thus,
while conditions involving the prevention of errors (i.e., risk
prediction) activated the superior AIC, conditions involving
the adaptation to a committed error (i.e., negative feedback)
correlated with inferior AIC activation. This highlights the
possibility that sub-regions of the AIC respond selectively to
behavioral adjustments demanded by different tasks. Contrary
to other structures associated with error processing, studies
have also shown that the anterior insula is selectively engaged
for conscious but not subconscious errors (Hester et al.,
2005; Klein et al., 2007). It has also been discussed as an
indirect contributor to other known correlates of conscious error
perception such as the electrophysiological Pe component (Klein
et al., 2007). Indications that perceived increases of autonomic
arousal underpin the conscious perception of errors come
from studies contrasting autonomic activation to conscious and
subconscious errors. They report increases in skin conductance
(O’Connell et al., 2007), heart rate deceleration and pupil
diameter (Wessel et al., 2011) toward erroneous relative to correct
responses for consciously but not subconsciously committed
BOX 1 | The relation between emotions, interoceptive states and motor actions. The assumption that interoception exerts a direct influence on action representation
raises the question how different emotional states and awareness of these influence agentic input to action selection. Intriguingly, recent evidence from Marshall et al.
(2017) reports that events of different valence modulate markers of interoceptive states in distinctly different ways. While neutral stimulus repetitions were found to
elicit elevation of the Heartrate Evoked Potential (HEP) component, repetitions of negative stimuli were found to produce a significant decrease of HEP amplitude.
Increased amplitude of the Heartrate Evoked Potential has been widely interpreted as an indication of increased embodied self-awareness (Critchley et al., 2004;
Pollatos and Schandry, 2004; Pollatos et al., 2005). The authors’ findings thus suggest that while neutral events may lead to an increase of interoceptive states,
negative events reduce sensitivity to internal states. Several papers have argued that interoceptive awareness is a prerequisite for conscious forms of action
regulation and error monitoring (Ullsperger et al., 2010; Prinz, 2012; Sueyoshi et al., 2014). Following this argument, lowered interoceptive awareness, signaled by a
lower HEP after experiencing a negative event, would lead to reduced conscious control of actions. However, this interpretation runs contrary to findings in the
cognitive literature where experiences of negative events and depressed mood are associated with increased executive control and more elaborate processing of
information (Mackie and Worth, 1991; Schwarz et al., 1991; Bodenhausen et al., 1994). The cognitive literature interprets this phenomenon as an increased focus on
external events to speedily adapt to a hostile environment and prevent more negative outcomes. This interpretation is also offered by Marshall and colleagues who
propose that negative events may lead to a reduced internal focus (lower HEP) thus freeing up attentional resources to an adverse and challenging environment.
Interpreting reduced HEP amplitude as lowered interoception is therefore problematic if working from the premise that it is required for conscious forms of action
regulation (Wessel et al., 2011; Godefroid et al., 2016). Similarly, Seth et al.’ 2012 interoceptive predictive coding model postulates that ‘a sense of presence arises
when informative interoceptive prediction signals are successfully matched to inputs so that prediction errors are suppressed’ (p. 3). This suggests that reduced
interoception (i.e., reduced awareness of bodily signals) is the result of large error signals resulting from imprecise or inaccurate predictions which do not match the
true sensory feedback provided by the autonomic nervous system. However, this is not the case for the results of Marshall and colleagues’ experimental scenario in
which reduced HEP amplitude is the product of a match between actual and (accurately) predicted outcomes for repeated negative events. Thus, reduced HEP
amplitude in this scenario may not indicate reduced awareness of bodily signals. Instead it may signal the dissociation of the internal self from negative outcomes
which possibly promotes increased external focus to remedy a negative state and attend to a hostile environment. Marshall and colleagues’ findings thus suggest
that the construction of interoceptive awareness may be more complex than originally assumed. Rather than arising purely from a match or mismatch between
predicted and afferent sensory signals their observations highlight that decreased or increased interoceptive awareness may depend on multiple factors such as the
type of interoceptive state that is being projected and compared. This highlights the importance of carefully considering the experimental scenario when interpreting
the meaning of markers for internal states, as well as the need to explore the way events of different valence may influence interoceptive sensitivity and its effects on
motor actions.
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errors. In addition, the AIC has been found to increase
functional connectivity to other saliency network structures
in the somatosensory cortex during error awareness which
has been interpreted as an effort to amplify the salience
signal of a detected error (Ullsperger et al., 2010). Evidence
for the link between increased arousal signals and behavioral
adjustment comes from studies highlighting that activation of
the salience network coincides with improved task performance
(Weissman et al., 2006; Boly et al., 2007) as well as from clinical
observations which have attributed pathological alterations of
error awareness in autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and addiction to altered activity in the AIC (Paulus and
Stein, 2006; Hester et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008; Vlamings
et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2009; Paulus and Stein, 2010).
Ullsperger and colleagues’ line of reasoning rests on correlative
rather than causative evidence and will benefit from subsequent
research studying error awareness and arousal patterns among
patient populations with focal lesions to the anterior insula to
test the merit of this claim. However, the AIC’s monitoring
function of interoceptive, homeostatic states meets a common
consensus. Suggesting this as a platform toward conscious error
perception and subsequent behavioral adaptation thus forms a
plausible suggestion and provides an indication for the functional
importance of an interplay between interoception and motor
experience.
Electrophysiological evidence for the contribution of
interoception to error detection comes from work undertaken
by Godefroid et al. (2016) who conducted a Go/No-Go
task in which they explored the relation of interoceptive
awareness to electrophysiological correlates of conscious error
perception. The authors reported that the error positivity
(Pe) component’s amplitude to aware errors correlated
positively with interoceptive awareness measured through
a heartbeat detection task. Interestingly, this correlation
emerged only for trials in which participants could see their
responding hand and not for trials in which the hand was
obscured. Godefroid and colleagues’ findings thus provide
further evidence for interoceptive input to motor adaptation
and further indicate that interoceptive awareness may have
to interact with further sources of information to enable
error perception to reach conscious perception. These
findings correspond to work presented by Sueyoshi et al.
(2014) who conducted a similar investigation in which they
related interoception to error monitoring during a Simon
task while recording the amplitudes of the error related
negativity (ERN) and error-positivity (Pe) components.
Results showed that participants’ scores on the heart rate
detection task correlated with Pe amplitude irrespective
of stimulus valence while the correlation between the
ERN and heart rate score occurred only for emotionally
significant stimuli (disgust stimuli). Of particular interest
for the proposition that interoception influences action-
related states was that heart rate detection scores were also
correlated with the degree to which reaction times slowed
after error commission, thereby forming a further indication
that interoception contributes to behavioral adaptation and
regulation.
Interoception for Effective
Self/Action-Regulation
The link between interoception and action regulation suggested
by the work of Sueyoshi et al. (2014) is echoed in reports
linking greater interoceptive sensitivity (heightened perception
of interoceptive signals measured by a heartbeat tracking
task) to better self-regulation and pain tolerance. The
subjective experience of pain has been shown to depend
heavily on top-down influences such as expectations and
attention (Fardo et al., 2017). Thus, regulatory capacity has
the potential to greatly reduce its magnitude. Investigating
a sample of healthy individuals and somatoform patients,
Weiss et al. (2014) found that greater interoceptive
sensitivity corresponded to higher amounts of self-reported
regulation capacity. In addition, somatoform patients
showed decreased interoceptive sensitivity which coincided
with a lower threshold for pain. Similarly, Herbert et al.
(2007) reported that good heartbeat perceivers with high
interoceptive sensitivity showed more effective self-regulation
of physical load during an exercise task than poor heartbeat
perceivers.
However, despite empirical accounts linking interoception
to action regulation, heightened interoception is not always
related to greater action control. Interestingly, for intuitive
or subconscious processes, higher levels of interoception can
lead to more impulsive actions. For example, Ainley et al.
(2014) reported that interoceptive awareness is linked to a
higher likelihood of automatic imitation. The authors found
that good heartbeat perceivers had greater difficulty in inhibiting
the tendency to imitate an observed action and suggested that
high interoceptive awareness may produce a stronger internal
representation of action consequences which leads to higher
motor reactivity to observed actions. Similarly, Dunn et al.
(2010) discovered that increased interoceptive awareness could
either facilitate or hinder intuitive decision making depending
on whether perceived bodily signals suggested advantageous
or disadvantageous choices. Findings to this effect highlight
that interoceptive input to motor representations may result in
increased action regulation for conscious processes conducted
over longer time frames while leading to more impulsive actions
for transitory, subconscious processes.
A PERSPECTIVE ON INTEGRATING
ACTION REPRESENTATION AND
INTEROCEPTION
The evidence discussed thus far speaks to the link between action
prediction and the active generation of interoceptive states. It
also highlights the reverse relationship by detailing a contribution
of interoception to motor experiences which has remained
unaddressed in the literature to date. In the following section,
we elaborate on these links by providing a detailed proposal of
the functional relation between motor-states and interoception,
based on empirical findings addressing the connection between
both phenomena.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 180
fpsyg-09-00180 February 16, 2018 Time: 16:9 # 7
Marshall et al. The Interaction between Interoceptive and Action States
One line of evidence suggesting a reciprocal relationship
between action representation and interoception is provided by
functional neuroanatomy which postulates forward- and back-
projections in both directions. In neuroanatomical mappings
of interoceptive inference, the general argument is that the
insula is the primary locus for comparator mechanisms
signaling interoceptive prediction errors, whereas the cingulate
and orbitofrontal cortex are considered key structures for
interoceptive prediction signals. However, more recent proposals
suggest that visceromotor areas, particularly the anterior insula
cortex (AIC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), collectively
issue interoceptive predictions and encode prediction errors
(Seth and Friston, 2016). This is supported by convergent
anatomical connectivity and cytoarchitectonic patterns (Barrett
and Simmons, 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2015). Based on knowledge
obtained from neuroimaging studies, two pathways for direct
input from interoception to action representation could be
assumed.
First, the conjoint functioning of ACC and insular cortex
has been linked with automatic processes such as salience
processing and attentional direction (for review see, Medford
and Critchley, 2010). In the context of research on action
evaluation processes (as reviewed above), a co-activation has been
consistently observed during error awareness (Klein et al., 2007).
As previously mentioned, AIC activity as part of a wider salience
network has been suspected to play a role in amplifying the neural
signal associated with an erroneous action (Ullsperger et al.,
2010; Harsay et al., 2012). That is, interoceptive awareness-related
functions of AIC activity, including interoceptive prediction
errors, may influence motor experience by tuning the salience
of relevant sensory signals. Consequently – under predictive
coding – more or less attention is paid to ascending prediction
errors in the sensorimotor system so that they exert greater
influence on higher-level processing (c.f., precision-weighting,
Feldman and Friston, 2010; Shipp et al., 2013).
Second, earlier action selection processes provide another
pathway for interoceptive signals to contribute to action selection
and motor experience. The AIC has been implicated in
intentional action decisions concerning the what- and the when-
dimensions of an action, including the decision to inhibit an
action (Brass and Haggard, 2010; for review see Droutman et al.,
2015). In line with the insula playing a role for the anticipation
of affective states preceding choice behavior (Knutson and
Greer, 2008), direct influences between interoceptive and motor
predictions may be assumed at stages of action planning
and selection. Interestingly, during decision making processes,
action selection fluency signals have also been suggested to
prospectively contribute to a subjective sense of agency (Haggard
and Chambon, 2012, for a review; Wenke et al., 2010). This
contribution was found to be mediated by an exchange of
signals between prefrontal action selection areas and the parietal
cortex (Chambon et al., 2013). It could be hypothesized that
interoceptive predictions during intention formation have direct
effects on how feelings of selection fluency or dysfluency are
processed and thereby influence the experience of selfhood. The
strong interrelation between brain networks involved in action
selection and affect anticipation could be a crucial route for
interoceptive input to the sensorimotor system. Therefore, rather
than indicating a hierarchical relationship as suggested in models
which place motor states above interoception (Seth et al., 2012),
the overall pattern of neuroscientific evidence is supportive of
functional reciprocity between neuronal processes underlying
interoception and intentional action at different stages of
action processing and outcome monitoring. Neuroanatomical
evidence is backed up by cognitive and behavioral work
suggesting a functional interplay between two equivalent entities.
For example, work indicating that action representations can
influence interoceptive states has shown that the confirmation
of action predictions in a virtual environment leads to greater
immersion in its reality (Gutiérrez-Martínez et al., 2011) while
electro- and psychophysiological recordings as well as behavioral
indications suggest that interoceptive awareness influences motor
control by being a prerequisite for conscious error awareness
and the implementation of remedial actions (Ullsperger et al.,
2010; Wessel et al., 2011; Sueyoshi et al., 2014; Godefroid
et al., 2016). Thus, existing work touching on the interaction
between interoception and action does not point to an exclusively
hierarchical, unilateral relationship. Instead, evidence suggests
two parallel and highly interconnected processes.
A Proposal for the Functional Links
between Motor Actions and
Interoception
Based on the empirical and theoretical accounts discussed in this
paper, we propose three specific links detailing the interaction
between motor actions and interoception (see Figure 1), each
of which forms an important avenue for future research into
bodily selfhood. Our first proposal concerns the contribution of
interoceptive predictions to the generation of motor states. The
second link addresses the impact interoceptive signals may exert
on reflexive and pre-reflexive levels of motor processing. The
third link differentiates between the nature of transitory motor
and continuous interoceptive signals.
First, while past accounts have theorized about the
contributions of motor predictions to interoceptive states (see
Seth et al., 2012 as an example) the idea of anticipated internal
states affecting motor perception has remained unaddressed. We
suggest a potential impact of interoceptive outcome predictions
on motor experience and actions. This equates the functional
significance of autonomic and sensorimotor predictions and
constitutes a bi-directional link in which both entities carry
equal weight in the way they contribute to and/or modulate
the generation of subjective experiences such as agency and
ultimately, embodied selfhood. While the above mentioned
work suggests a reciprocal relationship between motor states
and interoception, it should be noted that empirical findings
still need to corroborate the idea of a predictive element in the
generation of interoceptive states. As empirical studies with a
clear focus on isolating a predictive element for interoceptive
awareness are still lacking, our theory suggesting an effect of
interoceptive predictions on actions is based on theoretical
rather than empirical accounts. An empirical test of interoceptive
inference, especially the proposed contribution of interoceptive
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FIGURE 1 | Graphical representation of the interaction between interoception and motor actions (adapted from Seth et al., 2012). Predictions relating to
interoception and motor experience are generated in the state module. They are passed to the error module where they are compared to the afferent input relayed
from the sensorimotor system for actions and the autonomic system for interoceptive states. The resulting error mismatch signal is sent back to the state module
where it is processed to translate into a heightened or reduced sense of action ownership or interoceptive embodiment. We further propose three potential pathways
in which interoceptive input could influence motor experience: (1) Interoceptive predictions [iPred] contribute to the experience of motor states. (2) The overall
interoceptive state [iOut] transmits continuous information to the sensorimotor system (the overall motor state [mOut] transmits a transitory signal). (3) Continuous
interoceptive information is used for reflexive forms of action control (the gray dotted barrier indicates that interoceptive input is received but is not necessary for
pre-reflexive action control).
predictions to action representations, could be achieved by
inducing expectations of specific interoceptive feeling states
to explore whether this affects electrophysiological markers of
agency for actions in line or contrary to the expected mood. The
potential verification of an impact of interoceptive predictions
on motor states could lead to a more parsimonious account of
the general idea of predictive coding as applied to the perception
of internal and external events. Core concepts of predictive
coding such as active inference (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001;
Friston et al., 2011) would now apply equally to interoceptive
and motor experience. Similarly, forgone theories resting on
the assumption that actions can be guided by specific feeling
states they wish to achieve in the near or far future (Prinz,
2012) could likewise be integrated into the emerging theory of
interoceptive inference. Evaluating the premise that actions may
be guided by predicted internal states also offers the possibility
of exploring the way specific motivational factors and individual
differences relate to action planning, thereby leading to a more
holistic, ecologically valid understanding of motor execution.
Furthermore, considering interoceptive and motor states as
equal entities may also contribute to a deeper understanding and,
in the long term, a more effective treatment of Schizophrenia,
Tourette’s Syndrome and Depersonalization Disorder in
which abnormalities of action experience and interoceptive
awareness often co-occur. Frequently, interoception and
action experience are not impaired to the same extent and
in certain cases one component is left intact. This opens the
possibility of harnessing the intact dimension to alleviate
symptoms associated with the malfunctioning one (i.e., by
developing training to increase interoception which may
improve dysfunctional motor behavior or action awareness and
vice versa).
Secondly, we suggest that the contribution of the overall
interoceptive state may differ for reflexive and pre-reflexive
states of motor control (Figure 1). Based on empirical reports
from the literature on error monitoring and action control,
we propose that higher interoceptive awareness may lead to
increased action regulation for conscious, reflexive processes
performed over longer time spans while leading to more
impulsive actions for pre-reflexive, transitory processes (Ainley
et al., 2014). Furthermore, past theories (Seth et al., 2012)
consider experiences of motor actions and interoception to
be independent entities and state that input from one to the
other is not necessary for either to function. Contrary to this,
we argue that, while it may not be necessary for pre-reflexive
forms of agency experience and motor control, interoceptive
input is a prerequisite for reflexive forms of action control. We
base this claim on studies showing that successful behavioral
adaptation is only implemented after conscious error awareness
and that conscious awareness of error commission leads to
a significant increase in electrophysiological markers of error
monitoring (O’Connell et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2011; Sueyoshi
et al., 2014). Empirical insight into the necessity of interoceptive
input for reflexive versus pre-reflexive forms of motor control
could be obtained from studying patients with lesions to brain
areas implicated in specific interoceptive processes, such as the
anterior cingulate cortex for interoceptive predictions (Critchley
et al., 2004; Tamietto and De Gelder, 2010) or the anterior
insula for the interoceptive error signal (Paulus and Stein,
2006; Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2012). Observing impairments
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to reflexive but not pre-reflexive forms of action control among
this participant sample would corroborate theoretical accounts
of agentic action control as well as offer insight into the
causal relation between action representations and interoception.
A line of research aiding the distinction between interoceptive
input for pre-reflexive and reflexive action control could lie
in exploring the autonomic correlates of (pre-reflexive) agency
experiences, for which there is as yet no unequivocal evidence
(cf. David et al., 2011). An interesting avenue for further
research would therefore be to explicitly analyze how processes
underlying autonomic regulation and action awareness operate
and interact in the mind. Exploring trial-by-trial correlations
between agency and markers of autonomic functioning could
provide fruitful measures to distinguish between the effects
of interoceptive states on conscious and pre-conscious forms
of agency. Evidence for a link between interoceptive input
and reflexive forms of action control may have significant
implications for alleviating the symptoms of certain chronic
conditions. For example, work relating heightened interoception
to an increased regulatory capacity for pain highlights that
treatments to increase interoception, potentially via immersion
in virtual environments, could have the potential to alleviate
symptoms for somatoform patients or individuals suffering from
chronic pain. A possible differentiation between interoceptive
input for different forms of action regulation has significant
implications for our understanding of disorders in which action
experience and action regulation are impaired. For example, high
interoceptive accuracy is a common occurrence among highly
anxious individuals (Stevens et al., 2011). These individuals have
also been shown to display more impulsive and disinhibited
behavior (Kashdan and Hofmann, 2008) while simultaneously
demonstrating more risk aversion for long-term decisions about
the self (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Considering a differential impact
of interoceptive awareness on different forms of action regulation
could provide insight on such behavioral patterns and lead to a
deeper understanding of factors underlying action regulation.
Thirdly, the idea of predictive coding rests on the premise
that an overall experience of selfhood and associated motor
experiences are achieved by comparing predictions against
afferent sensory feedback. We propose that the signals arising
from this comparison (i.e., the error signal) may fulfill distinctly
different roles in the generation of subjective motor experience
depending on whether they transmit interoceptive or action-
related information. Past work by Damasio (2003) argues that
constant transmission of signals which reflect the body’s internal,
private states is necessary for the construction of selfhood and
ultimately consciousness. A sense of the self as an entity in time
and space is considered an antecedent of motor experiences such
as action ownership and action authorship (i.e., agency) (Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009). Furthermore, Prinz (2012) provides a
compelling theoretical argument in which he highlights the
necessity of continuous bodily signals for conscious, agentic
forms of action-control. Prinz (2012) distinguishes between
two kinds of action control: a more basic, animate control
of movement which is driven by former inner or outer
circumstances and an evolved, agentic form of action control
which, akin to the idea of active inference, is geared toward
generating future anticipated outcomes. Animate action control
is considered a transitory, state based process in which actions
are generated in a bottom-up fashion to match the demands
of an event. Conversely, agentic control is a longer-lasting,
plan-based process in which actions are selected to produce a
specific future goal. Prinz argues that a prerequisite for agentic
action control is a continual awareness of the self as an active
agent pursuing intentions and goals within a given environment.
This raises an important point, as motor signals are by nature
transient and thus do not possess the continuous format needed
to achieve prolonged, agentic action control. The uninterrupted
input needed for prolonged and continuous motor experience
and action regulation can therefore only be guaranteed by the
continuous stream of interoceptive signals. Prinz thus considers
interoceptive input toward the formation of agency as the
building block for implementing top–down, action regulation
geared toward achieving desired outcomes in the near or far
future and makes a convincing argument for the necessity of
direct interoceptive input for long-lasting forms of conscious
action control. He thereby emphasizes that the uninterrupted
stream of interoceptive information is necessary for conscious
forms of agentic action control as this top–down regulatory
approach which is often conducted over prolonged time spans
cannot be achieved by transitory motor signals.
Based on this, we suggest that the motor experience error
signal is the product of transitory motor signals relayed
from the sensorimotor system and thus short-lived, while the
interoceptive error signal is the result of continuous visceral
information about internal bodily states transmitted by the
autonomic nervous system. In line with Prinz’ argument, we
thus suggest that conscious agentic forms of action control
require this continuous input and are therefore reliant on
interoceptive input. Thus, while the sensorimotor system
may not require input from the interoceptive unit for pre-
reflexive forms of action control, we suggest that continuous
interoceptive input is required for conscious forms of agentic
action control. An empirical contribution highlighted by the
continuous nature of interoceptive input for motor actions
would lie in a detailed exploration of how interoception relates
to action selection, action completion and agency attribution.
Based on findings that fluency during action selection leads
to greater agency experience (Haggard and Chambon, 2012),
future work could explore whether changed autonomic responses
and brain activity in the anterior cingulate and anterior
insula cortex during a scenario of uncertain action selection
relate to reduced feelings of agency. Similarly, the work of
Allen et al. (2016) has demonstrated that unexpected bodily
arousal affects confidence in perceptual decisions. If paired with
measures of interoceptive awareness, their work provides a
promising basis to explore whether unexplained bodily arousal
reduces interoceptive awareness and whether this subsequently
underpins the observed reduction of individuals’ confidence
and precision regarding agency judgments. Findings to this
effect would provide further evidence on the exact nature of
the way in which continuous interoceptive input contributes to
experiences of agency. A similar outcome would be achieved
by investigating how the extent of interoceptive awareness, for
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example by measuring anterior insula activity, relates to feelings
of action completion. Studies corroborating the necessity of
continuous interoceptive input for long-lasting forms of action
execution offer a potential account of the way in which we
construct a seamless phenomenological experience of selfhood
into which we integrate transitory motor signals. The link
between interoception and action regulation indicates that a
heightened or lowered awareness of internal states significantly
impacts on the perception of and interaction with the external
environment. Promoting and training individuals’ interoceptive
capacity could thus significantly improve social interaction
and safe navigation of a busy and taxing daily environment.
Additionally, the possibility that interoceptive signals may be
integral to long-term action planning provides a new angle to
exploring individual differences concerning decision making for
phenomena such as delayed gratification (Mischel et al., 1989)
and reward discounting. Interestingly, discounting of delayed
reward is more pronounced among individuals displaying
addictive behaviors (Kirby et al., 1999; MacKillop et al., 2011)
who have also been reported to show altered AIC activity
thought to reflect aberrant interoceptive processing (Paulus and
Stein, 2010). Findings to this effect highlight the importance
of investigating whether interoceptive input may affect long-
term action regulation among both normal and pathological
population samples.
The Social Construction of Conscious
Interoceptive and Agentic Experience
To date, the literature discussed in this paper does not provide
an indication about the processes that may contribute to
the development of frameworks necessary for the conscious
experience of motor actions and interoception. However, Prinz
(1990, 2003, 2005, 2006) offers a comprehensive theoretical
account of how the framework for conscious self-related
cognition may be constructed. Considering this paper’s focus
on the interaction between action and interoception, a brief
look at these mechanisms is warranted as they simultaneously
provide an indication of the primary link between both
components. In Prinz’ (2012) view, the formation of internal
architectures for motor actions and intention, as well as for
self-related cognition are the product of an interaction between
external social mirrors and internal mirror like representational
devices. These allow an individual to arrive at a conscious
understanding of self by seeing their actions and internal states
reflected in others. The central premise of this idea is that
individuals use their own body and mind to mirror others’
motor actions and affective states during social encounters
(Tronick, 1989; Lakin et al., 2003; Brass and Heyes, 2005; Kring
and Moran, 2008). This interaction is thought to contribute
to the formation of internal action schemas used to match
one’s own actions and affective states to those of others
via a common coding mechanism for perception and action
(Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001). These action schemas are
subsequently used for the understanding of action volition,
the development of a coherent self-structure as well as the
ability to mentalize and engage in affect-regulation (Gergely
et al., 2002; Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). They thus form the
building blocks used to represent conscious self-generated motor
actions and feeling states (Gergely et al., 2002; Southgate et al.,
2009; Paulus, 2012) and constitute the underlying mechanism
of the phenomenological states discussed in the above sections.
The parallel evolution of action schemas used for action and
interoception via the shared medium of social interactions
thus forms a further indication of the strong link between
both components. It further implies a moderating influence of
social factors by suggesting that the social mirroring and social
regulation process is a contributing factor toward generating
interoceptive- and motor-related feeling states which contribute
to a conscious experience of selfhood. However, empirical
evidence exploring the impact of social factors on agentic and
interoceptive states is still lacking and a detailed theoretical
evaluation of their contribution lies outside the scope of
this paper.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide an overview of the interaction between
interoception and motor actions. Empirical and theoretical
accounts of this link suggest a functional interplay in which
motor and interoceptive contributions carry equal weight
and have the potential to reciprocally impact on motor and
interoceptive feeling states to generate a conscious experience of
selfhood. Here we conceptualize this relationship by suggesting
three specific links between interoception and motor actions.
Firstly, we implicate interoceptive predictions in the generation
of motor experience. Secondly, we distinguish between reflexive
and pre-reflexive forms of motor control and the way in
which interoceptive input affects each. Thirdly, we advocate the
necessity of continuous interoceptive input for conscious forms
of agentic action control.
A functional link between interoception and motor-actions
has been considered and even implicitly assumed in the
burgeoning field of research exploring the self-attribution of
action and internal states in light of embodied selfhood. Research
on the precise nature of this link as well as the neural network
supporting it is still at its very beginnings. However, the anterior
insular cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex appear to be
critical underlying brain structures. Furthermore, motor actions
have been found to modulate interoceptive responses, and vice
versa, and recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that
interoceptive input has different effects on reflexive and pre-
reflexive forms of action states. The direction of these effects may
vary depending on the continuous or transitory nature of efferent
and afferent signals. The assumption of a bidirectional, functional
connection between motor actions and interoception provides
a novel theoretical angle from which to study the emergence
of selfhood by exploring the functional relationship between its
constituents. Empirical work to this effect has the potential to
pave the way toward more ecological forms of research which
captures the way our experience of motor states and our sense
of internal bodily states interact with one another to interface
with the environment and generate the bodily foundation of
phenomenal selfhood both in health and disease. Research along
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these lines may thus provide new methods for characterizing
subjective experiences and may also, in the long run, help to
combine scientific approaches in health, social and personality
psychology.
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